Introduction
In an interview given to the German daily newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung in 2006, European Commissioner Günther Verheugen, 62 years old at the time and second-term commissioner, declared that 'the evolution over the last ten years has given so many powers to top-level officials that the most significant political task of the 25 commissioners now consists in controlling this system.' He then went on to say: '[W]hen I read certain statements by officials, I am baffled. Their tone is technical, arrogant and condescending'; he added: ' [T] here is a constant turf battle between commissioners and high-level officials. Some of them seem to think: the commissioner will be leaving after his five-year term anyway, he is just a tenant in the house, whereas I am here to stay.' His statements caused an immediate uproar in EU circles. Sharp criticisms were not long in coming, from colleagues in the Commission, from the secretary general of the Commission and from European civil service unions. Within a week, Verheugen had no other choice than to back-pedal and stated before officials of his directorate general: 'I love you all, you got me wrong.'
This episode can be interpreted in several ways. In the context of EU politics , the Verheugen controversy might appear to be a 'political coup.' In keeping with the theme of German pressure to reduce the costs of the Brussels 'bureaucratic Moloch,' as Helmut Kohl called it in 1992, sparking a controversy was a way of closing ranks with the German government in the perspective of the German presidency, and possibly as a way to influence EU agenda. But the controversy also raises deeper questions concerning the transformation of the relationships between the commissioners and Commission officials. If these relationships have long been considered as nearly symbiotic and a driving force of the Community in a way close to the Durkheimian model of 'mechanical solidarity,' the last ten years of the Commission have shown that the solidarity between commissioners and their civil service has been put to a strain on more than one occasion: the strike in 1997-8 (Georgakakis,  2004b) ; scandals under the Santer Commission (Georgakakis, 2001 ) ; criticism and resentment against the Kinnock reform (Bauer, 2008; Ellinas and Suleiman, 2008) . The question might even be raised as to whether this lack of solidarity can be seen as a new and lasting feature of EU institutions (Wille, 2009) .
In this chapter, 1 I suggest that these tensions are related to sociomorphological transformations which are due not only to a change in the 'division of labor' within the European Commission as an organization, but also reflect a change of the balance of socio-political power resources within the field of Eurocracy. To put it simply, the gap between commissioners and civil servants of the Commission has never been wider in this regard . The profile of commissioners is increasingly based on national political authority rather than on a long-term commitment and investment in EU politics. Conversely, EU civil servants increasingly owe their positions to long-term 'in-house' investments involving the simultaneous production and accumulation of specific EU resources, skills, networks and credibility. In other words, there is a growing gap between people who have invested in the EU and people invested by the EU as their political representatives.
This approach sheds some new light on the process of differentiation between political and administrative elites within EU institutions (Haller, 2008) , and it explains divergent views at the top of the Commission as well as increasing internal tensions and 'crises' over the past 15 years. More importantly, analyzing such divergent trajectories can lead to a better understanding of some of the major ongoing institutional and political transformations within the EU institutional field, in particular with regard to the weakness of the Santer, Prodi and Borroso Commissions (Dimitrakopoulos, 2004; Hayward, 2008) , including the recent thesis on the decline of the European Commission and its ability to provide political leadership (Kassim and Menon, 2010) . During the 1990s, a number of scholars emphasized the importance of the leadership of the Commission. One of the conditions of the strength of Commission leadership was based on internal factors (Ross, 1995; Drake, 2000; Smith, 2003a) , such as political cohesion between commissioners and top civil servants and internal collective mobilization within the Commission. The increasingly divergent socio-political trajectories show
